Foreword: Making Sense of Information for Environmental Protection

Despite the ubiquity of information, no one has proposed calling the present era the Knowledge Age. Knowledge depends not only on access to reliable information, but also on sound judgment regarding which information to access and how to situate that information in relation to the values and purposes that comprise the individual\u27s or the social group\u27s larger projects. This is certainly the case for wise and effective environmental governance. A regulator needs accurate information to understand the nature of a problem and the consequences of potential responses. Likewise, the regulated community needs information to decide how best to comply with adopted rules, and the public needs information in order to accept the credibility and legitimacy of the regulatory regime. But governance also requires judgment regarding how to manage information itself - how to structure burdens of proof in light of goals such as public safety or promotion of economic growth, how to balance the public\u27s interest in disclosure against competing aims such as national security or the protection of trade secrets, whether to withhold information in the belief that it may actually be harmful to the recipient, and so on. This paper, written as a foreword for the Texas Law Review\u27s symposium issue, Harnessing the Power of Information for the Next Generation of Environmental Law, provides a model to understand the role of information in environmental law - how it is generated, utilized, and disseminated within regulatory processes. Drawing on the diverse and significant insights of the symposium articles, the paper attempts both to make sense of the role of information in environmental protection and to highlight significant questions and concerns

Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight

This Article highlights the. hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were caused by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the standard project hurricane risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis. of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a standard project hurricane when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical lawsuit that sunk New Orleans when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan\u27s failure some forty years later

Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight

This Article highlights the. hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were caused by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the standard project hurricane risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers\u27 decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis. of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a standard project hurricane when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical lawsuit that sunk New Orleans when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan\u27s failure some forty years later

Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law

Legal economic analysis has traditionally focused on the application of microeconomic theory to questions of legal import. Scholars have generally regarded macroeconomic effects of legal rules as lying beyond the purview of the legal decisiomnaker\u27s jurisdiction. This Article argues that such exclusion of macroeconomic subject matter from legal analysis may rest on a scientifically erroneous view of - the economic process. The conventional understanding of the economic process presumes an unlimited supply of material inputs and an infinite natural capacity to absorb waste outputs. Fundamental scientific principles suggest that this understanding is flawed. The economic process must necessarily be limited in scale by the capacity of the ecological superstructure to sustain it. Thus, in addition td the efficient allocation of resources, legal economic analysis also should be concerned with the sustainable maintenance of scale. Consideration of scale effects by legal decisionmakers cannot be safely ignored in the way that distributive effects have been, given that no political mechanism analogous to the tax and transfer system exists to regulate the scale of the macroeconomy

It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs

This Article, which is part of a larger project on the competing merits of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the precautionary principle (PP) examines one specific plank of the case against the PP: the claim that the principle’s ignorance of the opportunity costs of precaution leads to indeterminate or impoverishing policy advice. Because PP defenders emphasize the limits of human knowledge and the frequency of unpleasant surprises from technology and industrial development, they prefer an ex ante stance of precaution whenever a proposed activity meets some threshold possibility of causing severe harm to human health or the environment. Importantly, they prefer this stance even in the face of potential benefits—such as those promised by the use of nanoparticles in groundwater remediation or skin protection—that may themselves be ameliorative of environmental, health, and safety dangers. Although their reasoning has never been perfectly clear, advocates of the PP regard such foregone benefits as conceptually distinct from, and somehow less central than, the more affirmative consequences that may result from allowing potentially harmful activities to proceed

Book Review: Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility

This essay reviews Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger\u27s recent book, Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalismto the Politics of Possibility, in which the authors argue that the future of environmentalism, and of American politics more broadly, lies not in stronger evidence, better science, and more reasoned appeals to the public, but instead in sheer marketing acumen, in forming and framing policy goals in a manner that activates the deeply embedded values and cognitive metaphors of the public.The essay first argues that Nordhaus and Shellenberger\u27s critique of environmentalism overlooks the diversity that exists within theenvironmental movement and that, to a large extent, anticipates the themes they claim to be introducing. The essay then examines Nordhaus and Shellenberger\u27s proposed alternative to environmentalism, a version of Richard Rorty - inspired romantic pragmatism that the authors dub the politics of possibility. The essay argues that Nordhaus and Shellenberger\u27s alternative approach is ultimately self-undermining, in that virtually any policy aim on their account could be packaged and marketed to activate virtually any cultural worldview. Finally, the essay takes a more constructive turn, identifying the kinds of questions that a truly post-environmental politics would be required to answer in order to avoid the nightmare of Nordhaus and Shellenberger\u27s republic ofconsultants

Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental Assurance Bonding, and Symmetric Humility

To date, the turn toward market-based regulatory tools in the environmental, health, and safety context has tended to focus on taxes, tradable permits, and information disclosure rules, with comparatively little attention devoted to environmental assurance bonds. This paper argues that environmental assurance bonding offers a particularly attractive regulatory approach for contexts – such as the present state of nanoscale science and engineering – in which both the risk and the benefit sides of the regulatory equation are characterized by great uncertainty. Historical examples and existing scholarly analyses of environmental assurance bonding are reviewed, and the resulting lessons are situated within the larger debate over economic cost-benefit balancing and precautionary approaches to environmental law and policy. In particular, the paper argues that environmental assurance bonding displays the virtue of symmetric humility, paying due heed to the dynamism and complexity both of sociolegal systems such as markets and of biophysical systems such as aquatic ecosystems

Discounting, On Stilts

This paper provides a critical overview of several articles presented at the Intergenerational Discounting and Intergenerational Equity Conference held at the University of Chicago Law School on April 27-28, 2006. First, it demonstrates that conventional normative justifications offered for the use of discounting future costs and benefits for policy analysis in the intergenerational context do not withstand scrutiny. Second, it observes that the compensatory transfers that are sometimes thought to sanitize the cost-benefit procedure in the intergenerational context are deeply problematic, both in their theoretical construction and in their practical adequacy for the tasks they are being deployed to accomplish. Third, it argues that although some analysts have been careful to acknowledge the need to address questions of intergenerational equity directly through other policy mechanisms, these analysts have understated the difficulty of limiting discounted cost-benefit analysis to its proper sphere of competence

Preferences for Processes: the Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice

This Article examines a conceptual distinction between product-related information (such as whether a consumer good threatens to harm its user) and process-related information (such as whether a good’s production harmed workers, animals, or the environment) that has appeared in various guises within international trade law; domestic environmental, health, and safety regulation; and constitutional commercial speech jurisprudence. This process/product distinction tends to dismiss information concerning processes as unworthy of attention from consumers or regulators, at least so long as the processes at issue do not manifest themselves in the physical or compositional characteristics of resulting end products. Proponents have offered the process/product distinction as a useful device for determining when consumer product regulations are likely to have drifted beyond the satisfaction of significant consumer interest into areas of unjustified alarm, disguised protectionism, or excessive encroachment onto competing interests, such as the speech concerns of product manufacturers or the domestic sovereignty of foreign nations. As this Article shows, however, the process/product distinction proves far too thin and formalistic of a conceptual device, once one examines the full panoply of reasons why consumers might express preferences for processes. Thus, rather than dismissing process preferences as especially likely to be ill-informed or otherwise objectionable, this Article argues in favor of acknowledging and accommodating such preferences within theoretical frameworks for policy analysis. Indeed, in view of several growing phenomena — including the cultural and political significance attached to the consumption function, the effort by regulatory cost-benefit analysts to ground public policies on the values revealed by individuals acting in their roles as market actors, and the integration of global product markets without similarly expansive integration of the global regulatory system — this Article concludes that, in the future, process preferences may serve as indispensable outlets for public-regarding behavior